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The moral economy of settler colonialism 





Abstract: The evacuations of settlements in a colonial situation can represent moments of potential 
rupture and reversal of a political order rooted in dispossession. In the case of Israel/Palestine, however, 
such moments are characterized by the re-articulation and re-legitimization of the settler colonial 
enterprise. This takes place through the development of a specific moral economy founded on the political 
mobilization of trauma. Drawing attention to the multifaceted ways in which the evacuations of the 
colonies are translated by different social actors into a moral inversion –where the evacuated dispossessor 
becomes a traumatized victim– allows us to grasp one of the dominant moral imaginaries in Israel’s 
settler colonial model.   
 





Trauma does not in itself legitimate a political claim 
[…]. Trauma does not produce entitlement [...]. In a 
reactive relation to trauma, the trauma determines 
us unilaterally, even as we operate within its horizon 
and by way of its internal logic […]. Trauma 
presents us with a specific responsibility precisely 
because it threatens to render us pure victims who, 
by definition, cannot take responsibility for the 
conditions we impose on others. 
JUDITH BUTLER, Parting Ways. Jewishness and the 





At the beginning of October 2012 the Israeli newspaper Jerusalem Post published an article 
entitled Peace-Traumatic Stress Disorder. The author, Michael Freund diagnosed a 
widespread pathology among Israeli politicians: a psychological disorder whose roots, 
according to Freund, can be traced back to the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo peace agreements’ 
period (1993-1999), and the successive unilateral measures adopted by different Israeli 
                                                        
1 I am grateful to the School of Social Science of Institute for Advanced Study of Princeton for conferring 
me the 2012-2013 Fellowship that made possible the writing of this article. While I was a Richard B. Fisher 
Member at the Institute, I benefited from the precious suggestions of many colleagues who read and 
commented different version of this article: Lorenzo Alunni, Lucas Bessire, Vincent Dubois, David L. 
Eng, Sara Farris, Didier Fassin, Neve Gordon, Laurence Ralph, Catherine Rottenberg, Joan W. Scott. 
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governments as a result of what their leading figures called “the absence of a Palestinian 
partner for peace”. Freund describes the “syndrome” as an “anxiety condition”: the will 
of the Israeli leadership to relinquish the “Land of Israel” through unilateral steps –the 
evacuation of some of the colonies established after the 1967 occupation of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip. The direct target of his article is the ex-Israeli Defense Minister 
Ehud Barak and one of his recent speeches at the Israeli Institute for National Security 
Studies, when the Minister advocated for more Israeli unilateral action in order to 
“achieve peace in the region”. In Freund’s column, Barak –together with the right-wing 
Netanyahu-led Israeli government– was accused of promoting the conditions for the 
emergence of what the author calls “new Arab terror” and fuelling “intra-Jewish 
conflict” by proposing the unilateral measure of new disengagements from some non-
strategic outposts of the West Bank: 
  
What about the 2005 unilateral [Israeli] pullout from Gaza [implemented by the 
Sharon government] and the expulsion of the Jews from Gush Katif [the name 
of the block of Israeli settlements in Gaza, evacuated in 2005], which brought 
Hamas to power and exposed southern Israel to unprecedented rocket fire? […] 
Israel implemented a policy of unilateral withdrawal, and it blew up in our faces. 
[…] The current government seems to be determined to recreate the trauma of 
forcibly removing Jews from their homes. 
 
From the start, the non-ironic piece defines the difference between PTSD (Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder) and PETS (Peace-Traumatic Stress Disorder) as a mental 
health expert would when compiling a pathological index: “Whereas most of those who 
suffer from stress disorders seek to avoid any reminders of the original ordeal, victims of 
PETS ironically follow a different path. Indeed they seem compelled to embrace the 
trauma, and even to relive it” 2.  The author concludes his description of the pathology 
asserting that the only therapy against this chronic “evacuation syndrome” consists in 
reinforcing the Israeli hold on every part of “Greater Israel”, substantially pleading for 
more conquest of territory and the further reinforcement of colonial sovereignty.  
The effort to classify this sort of “immoral pathology” –an alleged “Jewish will to expel a 
Jewish population”, a formula that is mobilized by many Israeli social and political actors 
on the occasion of the evacuations of Jewish settlements– has perhaps to be understood 
as part of a peculiar form that the utilization of the language of trauma has taken within 
the Israeli-Palestinian situation in relation to the question of the settlements’ evacuation 
and decolonization. During the last two decades, different Israeli scholars have focused 
                                                        
2 Michael Freund, “Peace-Traumatic Stress Disorder”, Jerusalem Post, 6 October 2012.  
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on how political violence has been repeatedly interpreted through the lens of trauma and 
how political dynamics have often been filled with clinical meanings – on the occasion of 
the various Israeli wars against its neighbors, with the progressive emergence of the 
figure of the “traumatized soldiers” (Kimmerling 1993; Bilu, Witztum 2000); and 
especially during and after the violence of the Second Intifada (Friedman-Peleg, Bilu 
2011). But the role of the politics of trauma and its inherent regime of meaning in 
relation to such a central question within the Israeli-Palestinian settler colonial situation 
as the politics of settling, evacuating and territorial redeploying, remained widely 
unexplored.  
This tension between deployment of trauma and dispossession –at least in the way I 
analyze it in this article– is often obliterated in the debate on Israel-Palestine. And this is 
especially true when it comes to the politics of settling –often reduced to saturating 
images of settler violence against the Palestinians in the West Bank, and to a caricatural 
image of “the settler” as a religious-fundamentalist-illiberal (Dalsheim 2011). To be sure, 
my proposal is not to deny the intrinsic relationship between politics of settling, settler 
practices and violence, but rather to analyze a wider apparatus of meaning produced 
during the evacuations of Jewish settlements; an apparatus that is informed by the 
production of two intertwined socio-political constructs: trauma and morality.  
The dismantling of Jewish colonies are for the settler body politic moments of political 
instability in which the material infrastructures and the affective foundation of the settler 
colonial koiné seem to be at risk. A certain kind of familiar universe of experience seems 
–from a settler perspective– to be under threat. In fact, on these occasions, the settler 
system of meanings enters a state of “vertigo” which has to do with the underpinning 
constitution of the colony: the vertigo of the potential return of the colonized Palestinian 
in a physical, cognitive and mental space from which she/he was erased, and the 
potential loss of what has been acquired through conquest, expulsion and dispossession. 
Many different interpretations and experiences of these “vertiginous” events may 
potentially emerge within a settler-colonial polity, but what is striking in the case of the 
two main moments of evacuation in the history of Israel – the state-orchestrated 1982 
disengagement from Sinai, and the 2005 one from the Gaza Strip and some settlements 
of the West Bank – is the crystallization, during both evacuation events, of a common 
sense of understanding translated into the vocabulary of trauma –a nationally shared 
trauma. How does this affective “glue” (Ahmed 2004) operate in the framework of 
settler colonialism? What kinds of epistemic and political forces converge to produce 
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settler subjectivity as “traumatized victim” and call upon the nation to recognize the 
trauma of the evacuated settlers? How does it come about that an act like un-settling, 
that might be considered one of reparation for the Palestinians after decades of 
dispossession by military occupation and construction of civilian structures of 
colonization, could instead be interpreted and experienced by various components of the 
settler colonial polity as one of trauma, victimization and Jewish dispossession?3 How 
does trauma become a moral “frame”, in the sense in which this notion is articulated by 
Judith Butler (2005), enabling a series of operations of power whose ultimate effect is the 
re-legitimation of a regime of violence and displacement of the native? 
My proposal is to answer these questions by exploring the specific ways in which –
relying upon a series of clinical terms and tropes with which the Israeli public has 
become quite familiar– different Israeli social actors, having different political 
orientations, mobilize politically a series of moral feelings and values imbued with a 
traumatic register and whose political valence consists in the reproduction of both a 
Jewish settler-colonial morality and polity. I argue that the evacuations are relatively 
unexplored moments in which a certain kind of settler colonial ethos emerges, one in 
which a particular political utilization of trauma becomes clearly manifest.  Indeed, in a 
certain way, defining and experiencing the evacuations (the potential end of the colony) 
as traumatic (and thus morally illegitimate) corresponds to reaffirming the legitimacy of 
the colonization enterprise and re-tracing the moral-political limits of a community 
erected on settling and dispossession of the native.  
This re-legitimization takes place through a twofold utilization of the register of trauma –
a socio-political register that has a global dimension, as many of the cases described by 
Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman in their Empire of Trauma (2009) show4– in a way 
that allows the perpetrators of violence (the “traumatized settler”) to find legitimization 
for their activities of dispossession. The first of the utilizations consists in its de-
                                                        
3 We could argue, with Idith Zertal, that trauma is the language through which the Zionist project has 
given itself a legitimacy to inscribe and geographically transfer a combination of memory and oblivion of 
the European Holocaust to this region; and trauma has also been the language adopted in order to create a 
peculiar settler colonial citizenship through the transferring and dispossessing of the Palestinian inhabitants 
of the region. This process of construction of the Israeli national identity –based on the partial erasure of 
the Palestinian physical and imaginative presence– resulted in what Zertal defines the “trauma community” 
or “victim community” (Zertal 2005). What is interesting in the case of the evacuations is that trauma is 
not mobilized in order to legitimize settler dispossession, but rather to prevent its end.  
4 Rechtman and Fassin, in their description of the global landscape of suffering, explore different cases of 
mobilization of the moral economy of trauma: US veterans, Israeli and Palestinian NGOs during and after 
the Second Intifada, refugees, asylum seekers, migrants, the Balkan conflicts and other situations of 
humanitarian intervention. In many of these situations, the appropriation and deployment of trauma 
discourse reproduces and naturalizes a variegated array of inequality and domination relationships. 
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historicization: trauma and victimhood are claimed by decontextualizing it from the 
stratification of dispossessions (against Palestinians) in which the claimants (the settlers) 
live and which they contribute to reproduce. The second consists in the transformation 
of the clinical register of trauma into a moral one, whose ultimate aim is the 
legitimization of settling as an act of justice, and the identification of un-settling with 
injustice. We could define this twofold utilization of the register of trauma in the context 
of Palestine/Israel as the moral economy of settler colonialism –the social production, 
mobilization and circulation of moral values and norms politically functional to the perpetuation of settler 
colonial dispossession. Here the trauma discourse acquires three main functions: it is adopted 
for the description of an experience of suffering; it erases the historical conditions of 
possibility that led to that experience; it fuels a twofold moral claim about the justness of 
the colony and the un-justness of its end.   
In his proposition to revisit the notion of moral economy and develop an anthropology 
of the relationship between morality and politics, Didier Fassin stressed the heuristic 
relevance of those efforts of investigation which try to understand the political valence of 
the articulation, mobilization, and socio-political organization around the deployment of 
moral feelings and values (Fassin 2012). In the case of the Israeli evacuations of Jewish 
settlements, this notion is relevant both to the analysis of the dynamics of the 
evacuations and the theorization of their implications as a way of understanding the 
broader settler-colonial situation of Palestine/Israel. 
Analytically, it reveals the political implications of the deployment of trauma by the 
various actors involved in the evacuations. Living and interpreting the experience of the 
evacuation as a trauma inscribed in a linear sequence of Jewish expulsion and 
victimization can be analyzed –in light of the fact that the evacuations are ontologically 
related to an inceptive dispossession of the native– as a specific moral and political 
understanding of history that relies upon a trauma discourse that erases the moment of 
inception (and its historical repetition). Hence, the moral economy I focus on 
corresponds to a mechanism of constructing a particular settler-colonial political 
subjectivity based on the disavowal of native presence. This specific configuration of 
trauma produces a shared understanding (an affective glue) that the evacuations are a 
violation of the fundamental values and norms constituting the Jewish-Israeli settler-
colonial self and body politic.  
From a theoretical point of view, the notion of moral economy also seems appropriate to 
grasp another fundamental specificity of the political operation displayed during the 
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evacuations. In fact, my central argument here is that what takes place during the 
evacuations is a form of “moral inversion”, one in which what would be commonly 
understood within the framework of a moral economy of political reparation (the 
recognition of a practice of colonial dispossession) takes on the contours of (an 
experience of) victimhood: a traumatization of the national settler community and a 
violation of what Kareem Rabie and I defined as the “human right to the colony” (2012) 
– the claim to the right to colonize based on the argument that preventing colonization 
would correspond to a violation of the human rights of the settlers. Fundamentally, in 
the moral economy I investigate the potential end of domination is experienced and 
interpreted as the beginning of a regime of oppression against the Jewish settler polity. 
The 1982 evacuation from Sinai and the 2005 one from Gaza are two climactic moments 
in the emergence of this political deployment of “inverted” moral values. In the moral 
economy of settler colonialism the dispossessor (the settler-evacuee) is represented as the 
dispossessed and the potential return of the expelled native becomes an experience of 
settler national trauma. In other words, in these moments of decolonization manquée 
trauma becomes a discourse by which settler colonialism is re-legitimated, reproduced, 
and ultimately re-enacted. 
 
 “Painful concessions” and the “price of peace” 
 
Colonized territory and land occupy a singular place in the Israeli/Palestinian debates, 
and a special relationship with the moral economies of settler colonialism. In 1982, for 
the first time in its history, after the Yom Kippur War with Egypt and the peace 
agreement between the two countries, Israel was forced to prepare and implement the 
evacuation of its Sinai settlements and settlers –a move that was presented by the 
leadership to the Israeli public as a costly one: the “price of peace”.  Since then, a 
discursive tension has dominated the Israeli debate on evacuations and territorial 
pullouts: the “cost of peace” and the “painful concessions” signify the spectrum of 
“traumatic evacuations” and the possibility of conceding parts of the territory it occupies 
in exchange for a better relationship with its neighbors. Israeli “hawks” and “doves” 
have historically met on this common ground of discussion whose premise is that any 
form of peace, any form of agreement is bearer of something painful and traumatic for 
the Jewish population of Israel, and for Jews at large. What is radically at stake in this 
alchemy of territory and “painful peace” is an evaluation of the correct balance between 
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territory and pain –how much territory can or cannot be relinquished in order not to 
provoke too much pain in the Israeli public. Here the notion of evaluation has to be taken 
in its twofold dimension: it identifies both a quantitative-territorial and a moral value, 
one in which the sphere of geopolitical-cartographic and that of settler morality 
intermingle.  
The semantic sphere of painful concession relates to a tension that is articulated, 
ultimately, in the double dimension of suffering and morality. What is at stake when in 
the different stages of negotiations with the Palestinians and the Arab neighbors the 
notion of “painful concessions” is evoked by the Israeli negotiators is a tension between 
land/territory and values, between a settler colonial conception of sovereignty and a 
specific form of articulating the “value of peace”. One article on the Sinai evacuation 
(1987), defines this tension as an “anxiety over the reversibility of Zionism” –the 
potential end of the settler project. 
In spite of the fact that the Israeli public, as some journalists and pundits have 
suggested5, has presumably overcome the “trauma of Yamit” (Yamit was the main Sinai 
settlement evacuated in 1982), the disengagement and physical destruction of the 
settlements has remained impressed in the memory of several Israeli social actors as a 
trauma. Even today, some media, the settler movement and the Sinai evacuees –who are 
still depicted as “pioneers” who transformed the desert into a “lost paradise”– continue 
to refer to the 1982 evacuation as an “open wound”.  
In 2012, the Knesset –the Israeli parliament– dedicated a ceremony to the 30th 
anniversary of the evacuation in which the emotional effects of disengagement on the 
settlers were re-evoked as open wounds: the persistent return of a living past of suffering 
to the present. On that occasion, Knesset Speaker Reuven Rivlin described the 
evacuation as a persisting trauma: “Today too, 30 years after the evacuation of the Sinai 
region, the memories and sights make our hearts tremble. The State of Israel needs to 
rectify the injustice of having forgotten you. It needs to remember you as the ones who 
paid the price of peace [Italics mine] and Israel’s commitment to democracy”6. The register 
of trauma allows the evacuation to be described both as a presumed proof of the 
democratic nature7 of the state and more fundamentally as an open wound –in this sense, 
                                                        
5  “History foreshadows Gaza pullout”, Christian Science Monitor, 2005 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0721/p06s01-wome.html  
6  “Thirty years on, Yamit is still an open wound”, Israel Hayom, May 18, 2012, 
http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=4390 
7 The Knesset speaker deploys the tactical evacuation and the “painful territorial concession” as evidence 
of the democratic nature of the state.  
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the moral economy of trauma subsumes a sphere of judgment on and the assertion of 
the democratic history of the polity, erasing its settler colonial nature. The evacuation is 
still remembered as a painful historical injustice. 
 
The science of the “evacuation trauma” 
 
The discourse on the “trauma of Yamit” and the “price of peace” involved scholars with 
different backgrounds (some of whom directly took part in the evacuation operations) 
from the Israeli academic community. Significantly, the Sinai evacuation was the first 
occasion on which different specialists attempted to analyze the first government-led 
removal in Israeli history of part of the settler population. In 1987, the international 
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science dedicated an entire issue to the evacuation, hosting the 
articles of various Israeli scholars –sociologists, social anthropologists, political scientists, 
geographers, clinical psychologists and psychiatrists– who analyzed the disengagement 
under a title that evoked the moral dimension of the dismantlement of the settlements: 
“The Price of Peace: The Removal of the Israeli Settlements in Sinai”.  
Several contributors to the special issue from different political backgrounds and using 
diverse –mainly behavioral– approaches focused on the traumatic components of the 
evacuation, in what can be considered the first attempt at scientifically examining the 
“evacuation trauma”. Almost all the contributors, to varying degrees, related their 
understanding of the evacuation from Sinai to some kind of experience of psychological 
suffering and stress.  Sociologist Baruch Kimmerling identified the evacuation with the 
emergence of a social and political condition of anomie –a “clash of values”, half-way 
between the sociological and the psychological versions of this notion 8 . Geographer 
Nurit Kliot defined the disengagement as “geo-cultural trauma”, describing the evacuee 
as an alienated person who witnessed the “burial of the garden”. In the image the 
dismantled garden in the colony becomes a living being that is buried, in a further 
articulation of the process through which the register of psychological suffering overlaps 
with possession of the land. Kalman Benyamini, a professor of clinical psychology, 
analyzed the “psychologists’ behavior outside the clinic” and within the new 
experimental empirical context of the disengagement from Sinai. Mental health 
specialists who provided mental care to the settlers during the evacuations are described 
                                                        
8  The notion of anomie is also used in psychology to describe the state of distress and anxiety resulting 
from the difficulty of living “normal” –nomic– social relationships after traumatic events that have left a 
trace in the psyche.     
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by Benyamini as in a state of disorientation during their succor operations –thus the 
trauma of the settlers becomes a vicarious trauma, and the victimhood of the group 
extends to those who treated them.   
Echoing the rhetoric of the pioneering settlers, other authors, like professor of psychiatry 
Haim Dasberg and clinical psychologist Gabriel Sheffler, combined their specific 
approach to trauma with an alleged Israeli psychological specificity: “Israelis tend to 
identify with their common past of uprooting, persecution and continuous exposure to 
Arab hostility. Therefore, the typical Israeli looks for social acceptance and feelings of 
belonging within a hostile world” (1987: 92). The 1977 visit of the Egyptian president 
Sadat to the Knesset a year before the ratification of the peace agreement with Israel that 
then led to the 1982 Sinai evacuation was –according to the authors– one of the main 
pre-evacuation “stressors” for the settlers. A stress to which the settlers responded by 
starting to drain the natural resources of the region in which they were settled before 
being evacuated:  
 
During the time before the evacuation, they [the settlers] began to exploit 
intensively the restricted sources of ground water [of the desert] so that they 
could increase the harvest of out-of-season crops; they felt they had nothing to 
lose by doing this. Thus, the settlers began destroying natural resources, in 
contrast to their original idealistic intentions (Dasberg, Sheffler 1987: 93).  
 
The two mental health specialists diagnose a peculiar form of “neurosis”: the emergence 
of a kind of “anti-natural” conduct in contrast with the “ideals of development” of 
Zionism –a unique form of neurosis, consisting in making the desert bloom excessively9 in 
order to leave it in a condition of suffering. The trauma of the evacuation, the “price of 
peace”, is identified by these authors as a series of pathological behaviors in which the 
clinical and the moral overlap. Neurosis, depressions and psychosomatic complaints are 
read as a broader danger of interruption for the whole Zionist project, and as a crisis in 
the continuity between past, present and future of the community. It is also through 
these discursive constructions, in the space between the clinical and the moral, that the 
politics of trauma display their specific politics of history on the occasion of the Israeli 
evacuations. Clinical, moral and political suffering are welded together.  
 
From Sinai to Gaza 
                                                        
9  “Making the desert bloom” is one of the foundational slogans through which Zionist pioneers 
legitimized, using a developmentalist and modernist rhetoric, the colonization of Palestinian lands and the 
Israeli state-building process.   
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The 1982 Sinai evacuation, the different public and social discourses produced about 
trauma –in particular the debate on the “painful concessions”–, as well as the specific 
way in which scholars have experienced or told the experience of their involvement in an 
“event without precedent”, could be interpreted as an “experimental moment” in the 
history of Israel: one in which multiple actors dealt with an unusual event such as the 
state-orchestrated evacuation of some colonies through the lens of trauma and suffering. 
The politics of trauma became the shared jargon with which diverse social groups met, 
struggled and expressed their moral positioning and their understanding of the 
relationship between the past, present and future of the polity and the state.  
Twenty years later, in 2005, the politics of trauma re-acquired –after the failure of the 
Oslo peace process and the Second Intifada– a central role in the public debate on the 
evacuation from Gaza and the Northern West Bank. Significantly, settlers read the 
evacuation from Gaza as a “new Yamit”, a new traumatic event –as in Sinai 1982– in a 
long chain of Jewish suffering. But, in a certain sense, Gaza had already become Yamit 
immediately after the evacuation from Sinai, well before 2005.  In fact, immediately after 
the 1982 Sinai evacuation, one of the first decisions taken by the Israeli government was 
to approve construction of new Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip. Disengagement was 
followed by “re-engagement”. This governmental decision led the territorial dimension 
of trauma to reemerge in a new settler colonial form: the governmentally planned 
colonization of Gaza provided new territory, a new space of memorialization, in which 
the settlers inscribed the memory of the trauma and the “pain of the evacuation”: 
 
Some [new] settlements [in Gaza] were given names attesting the desire of their 
residents to return to Sinai, such as Mitzpe Atzmona (Overlooking Atzmona) or 
Elei Sinai (Toward Sinai). […] The yeshiva [religious school] of Yamit was 
moved into a new building in Neve Dekalim, in the Gaza Strip. The new 
concrete building [named the “Yamit Yeshiva”] was constructed like a giant Star 
of David with one point buried in the ground in remembrance of the 
destruction of the Yamit region settlements (Feige 2009: 203).  
 
It is in this sense that Gaza became a “new Yamit” well before 2005. The evacuation 
from Sinai was followed by the colonization of new territories in the Gaza Strip (and in 
the West Bank), transforming parts of the colonized territories into a memorial of the 
“painful evacuation” from Sinai, and the un-settling of Sinai in the settling of new 
territories. The displacement of the trauma of Sinai coincided with the new displacement 
of the native.    
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The destruction of the home (land) 
 
In 2003, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced unilateral disengagement from 
the Gaza Strip and the evacuation of 8000 Jewish settlers – what those settlers 
considered “the destruction of the home” (Zertal and Eldar 2007: xi). New narratives of 
trauma –whose ultimate meaning was representation of the evacuation from the colony 
as a trauma that would result in the end of a Jewish homeland– were triggered before, 
during and after disengagement. 
The disengagement plan was announced in 2003 and implemented by the Israeli security 
apparatus in summer 2005. The decision to evacuate Jewish settlers was presented by 
Sharon as an exit-strategy from the “peace process stalemate” (the remoteness of a final 
agreement with the Palestinians) as well as a “security imperative” resulting from the 
impossibility of continuing to protect a small number of Jewish Israeli settlers within the 
Gaza Strip, a territory populated by around 1.5 million Palestinians.  In reality, the plan 
was intended to redesign the broader geopolitical contours of the occupation and 
colonization. Sara Roy has explained that the pull-out was the result of a decade-long 
project to isolate Gaza within a wider plan to strengthen the Israeli regime’s control over 
Palestine. It was a tactical move undertaken during consolidation of Israeli settlement 
expansion in the West Bank, where many of the Gaza settlers were redeployed (Roy 
2007: 325-327). Ilana Feldman described the “disengagement” as another step in the 
construction of a “fictional” Palestinian sovereignty (Feldman 2008). 
In order to grasp the foundations of the politics of trauma displayed during and after the 
Gaza disengagement, we should pay attention to the colonial configuration of the regime 
and the political context in which these events occurred. As Eyal Weizman has shown, 
the disengagement created a sort of state of architectural emergency: the architectural 
components of colonization, the settling practices, the physical structures of settlements 
and their infrastructures, were under threat, and with them the contours of the Israeli 
settler colonial subjectivity. Benjamin Netanyahu, at that time Minister of Finance, left 
the Sharon government in protest at the potential scenario of “Palestinians dancing on 
the [evacuated Jewish] house roofs” of Gaza (Weizman 2007). Thus, the evacuation took 
place in a kind of state of settler colonial emergency. Depicting a doomsday scenario for 
Zionism, an alarmed law expert wrote at the time: “If the status of the Gaza settlements 
is temporal, what prevents us from seeing [the Israeli cities] Ashdod, Ashkelon, Ramla, 
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Lydda, Beer-Sheva, Eilat or Karmel as occupied territories, which would have to be 
evacuated eventually?”10. 
On the ground, during the evacuation procedures, the Gaza settlers produced a series of 
practices explicitly referencing the Holocaust. Some “tattooed” their ID numbers on 
their arms, protesting against “being placed in ghettos”11; many wore orange clothes and 
orange and yellow stars while being evacuated; a father, in front of the cameras, carrying 
his daughter in his arms, was filmed while shouting to soldiers “Expel her! Expel her!” 
(Gorenberg 2006: 375); some locked themselves in their houses. Discourses and 
practices knitted together into a moral economy of traumatization and victimization that 
modulated at various scales the representation of the evacuations as endless repetition of 
the Holocaust –with which many of the Gaza settlers had had no direct experience. The 
re-inscription and re-enactment of the evacuations as if they were in a relationship of 
continuity with the Holocaust produced a specific sense of the endurance of trauma, one 
that was performed in front of television cameras and in public spaces (Shor 2008; 
Tenenboim-Weinblatt 2008). Indeed, this public display of continuity of trauma 
constitutes the performative dimension of the moral economy characterizing the 
settlements’ evacuations. The memory of the extermination is mobilized in front of the 
rest of the Jewish nation as a way to impede the physical detachment from the 
infrastructures of dispossession.   
Thus, while it is true that the pull-out constituted a re-articulation of the Israeli colonial 
regime in the West Bank and Gaza on one level, at another the very materiality of the 
unsettling triggered a discursive mechanism in which the procedures of unsettling 
acquired –again, but in a much more articulated shape than Sinai 1982– the form of 
collective trauma on a national Jewish scale. Before, during and after the disengagement 
the settler movement added language for this kind of traumatisation: terms like 
expulsion, deportation, displacement, demolition, and destruction appeared in 
newspapers, television programs, magazines, websites, public discussions, and political 
debate in Israel. The material dimension of this localized evacuation helped produce 
images and perform scenes of trauma that were adopted as a moral discursive framework 
not only by the settlers in their resistance to the evacuation but also in widespread 
popular representations of the disengagement in the Israeli media. All three levels —
                                                        
10 Misgav H. quoted in Shor (2008: 812). 
11 N. Hasson, “Settlers ‘tattoo’ ID numbers on their arms”, Ha’aretz, 15-07-2005 
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practice, public discourse and popular representation— form the fundamental texture in 
which different Israeli social actors have inscribed their politics of trauma.  
 
The costs of the evacuation 
 
At this stage of our analysis, we have to further complicate our problematization of the 
moral economy of the evacuations and try to understand its twofold nature. In fact, one 
of the grounds on which is based the struggle between actors displaying their moral 
conception of the evacuations and their related political actions is that of defining what is 
the “good” and “bad government” of the disengagement. Both these are articulated 
within a broader moral economic framework which employs the common language of 
the costs of the evacuation from Gaza.  
At first glance, governing the disengagement may seem a common ground of encounter 
only for those who ultimately support of the evacuation in spite of its “traumatic nature” 
and who want to take part in a discussion on the best administrative, bureaucratic and 
operational practices to implement it. This accepts the fact that an evacuation must take 
place. But, as we will see, the discussion on the good and bad government of the 
disengagement progressively involved also those –settlers and not– who initially objected 
to and boycotted the evacuation, and, at a later stage, started to challenge –mainly 
through public advocacy and legal actions– the state and the actors who implemented the 
evacuations on the basis that the evacuation from Gaza was “badly governed”.  
Here, what is relevant to our reflection is that the language of costs –the costs of the 
evacuation– epitomizes a double register in the moral economy of the evacuation: a 
monetary-economic one –administering the material costs of the evacuation and the 
compensation system set up for the evacuees by the state– and a non-monetary-
economic one –administering the trauma and the psychological effects of the evacuation. 
These two levels can hardly be separated in our analysis, since the struggles surrounding 
the costs of the evacuation and those surrounding the trauma of the disengagement are tied 
to one another. Governing the disengagement is exactly the way in which the different 
actors came together, spoke about, or clashed, over the proper or improper oikonomia of 
the material and affective costs of the disengagement. If we look more carefully at what 
happened in the process of administering the dynamics of evacuation and post-
evacuation, we find that the monetary economy of the disengagement was subsumed 
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into the broader moral economy of the evacuations and its regime of settler colonial 
political morality.     
 
The “Disengagement Administration” 
 
One year before the 2005 evacuation, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced the 
creation of an ad hoc state body for the planning and administration of the 
disengagement. After the official announcement of the evacuation, the Prime Minister 
and his cabinet formulated a model of management for the pullout, one with different 
military, administrative and legal implications. The administrative architecture of the 
evacuations translated into the creation of SELA (Hebrew acronym for “assistance to the 
residents of Gaza”), the Disengagement Administration, a governmental body temporarily 
charged with planning and implementing the disengagement in coordination with the 
Prime Minister’s Office and various Israeli ministries. Very schematically, the temporary 
administration was responsible for two levels of planning and intervention: a monetary 
one involving negotiation of monetary compensations for material loss relating to the 
disengagement with the 1700 settler families –and the private companies which, in 
coordination with the state, had taken part in the “colonization in depth” of the Gaza 
Strip12–; and a non monetary form of aid consisting in socio-psychological assistance to 
settlers during the evacuation operation and their relocation in new accommodations set 
up by the government.  
From its inception, the Disengagement Administration became one of the central 
grounds of struggle between government and settlers. A consistent portion of the settlers 
refused to engage in any kind of negotiation with SELA as a sign of protest. As an 
attorney of the Legal Forum for the Land of Israel –a right-wing Zionist NGO active in the 
defense of the “human rights of the settlers” who stood up for the settlers against SELA 
and its assessment of settler properties– stated on the eve of the evacuation, after the 
rejection by the Supreme Court of Israel of one of his petitions against the creation of 
SELA: “The idea was to show [the court, thus the state] that we do not accept the 
legitimacy of throwing us out of our homes”13.  
                                                        
12 For instance the Israeli Electric Company, reimbursed by SELA in 2008 for losses resulting from the 





Parallel to the settler boycott against SELA, some organizations invoked psychological 
support for the evacuees. In 2004 the Israeli Social Workers and Union of Psychologists 
proposed to the government a plan of psychological assistance to the Gaza settlers. The 
Knesset rejected the plan, since the settlers refused to interact directly with the 
government and its disengagement mechanisms –thus refusing all forms of assistance as 
sign of rejection of the evacuation per se.  
Broadly speaking, the settlers reproached Prime Minister Ariel Sharon for using the 
Disengagement Administration as an instrument for splitting the settler community and 
obtaining consensus for the evacuation. But, besides these political accusations, it is 
interesting to note that the claims of the settlers were grounded on monetary 
compensation from the very inception of the SELA process. Indeed, from the beginning 
of the evacuation planning process, the destiny of the monetary mechanism devised by 
the state was subsumed into a broader discourse on and of trauma. In December 2004, the 
Legal Forum for the Land of Israel had already warned the government that: “[It should 
do] everything in its power to see to it that the communities stay together, wherever they 
are relocated. Every significant study, especially those regarding what happened when 
people were moved from Sinai [an explicit reference to the 1987 special issue of the 
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science] indicates that keeping communities intact helps to 
prevent post traumatic stress disorder, which can result in serious emotional disability”14. 
Hence, governing the disengagement seemed to involve struggling within its very specific 
affective regime. In fact, the political ecology of the disengagement proved more 
complicated than a quick and unambiguous negotiation between settlers and state on the 
material costs of evacuation. What was at stake was a much more complex order of 
morality concerning the place of the event in the Zionist conception of history.  
 
The costs of the encounter 
 
As we have seen, many settlers refused to negotiate the material price of the 
disengagement as a way of refusing the “rules of the game” regulating the costs of the 
evacuation. Given this framework of pre-evacuation “no-contact policy”, the only possible 
encounter between the settlers and the state was that between the tens of thousands of 
soldiers and the police involved in the physical implementation of the evacuation. This 
encounter was a key moment in the politics of trauma of the evacuation. The boycott of 
                                                        
14http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/88678#.UIB9da7WTNQ  
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the monetary discussion by many settlers as a sign of “moral integrity” paved the way for 
another kind of interaction:  
 
The nature of the encounter between the soldiers and the settlers was revealing. 
Before the events, the soldiers received training and rationales in order to 
withstand the mental stress of facing the settlers. They were to deaden their 
senses, or at least their reactions, and absorb passively whatever logical 
arguments or foul language the settlers would throw at them. Their only 
response was to refer the settlers to the decisions of the political authorities. To 
the annoyance and open anger of the settlers, their attempts to persuade their 
interlocutors met an impenetrable blockade, without responding subjects on 
whom they could exercise their discursive strategies. In response, the settlers 
attempted to “reindividualize” the soldiers standing in front of them –they 
wanted the soldiers to see themselves as being responsible for their actions. 
They called specific male and female soldiers by name, alternately luring and 
threatening them. They sobbed to the troops that the soldiers were war 
criminals hiding behind anonymity like the Nazis before them (Freige 2009: 267-
268).  
 
If, on the one hand, the majority of the settlers –complying with their line of boycott– 
rejected any kind of preparation for this encounter, including governmental mental 
health preparations, on the other hand, the Israeli army provided its soldiers with some 
mental health training, in view of the physical implementation of the evacuation and the 
encounter with the settlers. The pre-evacuation mental training consisted of a sort of 
moral-political preparation of the soldiers:  
 
A month-long orientation program which included the following two main 
elements: (1) reviewing, discussing, and reinforcing the democratic values of as 
well as the legal aspects inherent in the particular political situation the country 
was facing; and (2) simulation exercises to anticipate every possible development 
in the evacuation process. The first element contributed to the legitimation of 
the task, which was atypical in a military context and, moreover, was to be 
carried out in a situation of absence of a political consensus. The second 
element involved analyzing and resolving conflict solutions vis-à-vis a civilian 
population of men, women, and families with children. Exercises in various 
types of behaviors and responses were carried out, including using the right 
wording to try to persuade and calm the evacuees. The task demanded both 
sensitivity and assertiveness (Gilbar, Ben-Zur, Lubin 2010: 549-550). 
 
The echo of the encounter between soldiers and settlers, and the nature of the 
psychological preparation received by the soldiers and police in order to make the settlers 
accept the “cost of the evacuation”, would occupy a relevant position in the post-
evacuation debates and struggles conducted through the register of the politics of 
trauma. In 2008, after an investigation undertaken by a team of scholars and 
psychologists sympathizing with the evacuees, a complaint was sent to the Ethics 
Committee of the Israeli Board of Psychologists against two of the psychologists who 
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took part in the Mental Preparations for the Disengagement Mission –the kit distributed by the 
Israeli Army to its soldiers on the eve of the disengagement– and the other procedures 
for preparing the mental health of the soldiers. Some excerpts from the complaint 
submitted to the Israeli Board of Psychologists can help us understand another 
important chapter in the articulation of the politics of trauma during the Gaza 
disengagement: “The expulsion of the Jews from twenty-one settlements in the Gaza 
Strip and four settlements in northern Shomron [northern West Bank], and the 
transformation of these settlements into piles of destruction, was a calamity for those 
who were expelled, a blow for those faithful to the return to Zion, and a national trauma 
for Israel and the entire Jewish nation”. As we said, the register of the politics of trauma 
is articulated by different actors in terms of “destruction of the homeland”, a settler-
national calamity. The report-complaint continues: “How was the IDF [the Israeli Army] 
transformed into an army of expulsion? […] It was done by releasing the soldiers from 
their conscience, by carrying out exercises in “emotional disconnect”, so that they would 
be transformed into obedient robots”. A long series of interviews and enquiries on the 
nature of these preparations, combined with the analysis of an article –“The 
Disengagement Mission. A Look from Within”– published by the two psychologists who 
collaborated with the army in the pre-evacuation period, resulted in an accusation of 
“brainwashing” against the army and the state and pushed the authors of the report to 
the following conclusion:  
 
The psychologists instituted a silent revolution within the army, without the 
knowledge of the soldiers and the citizens of Israel. The IDF [the army] was 
transformed from a protecting fighting force into a postmodern army. […] The 
IDF became an army which instead of concentrating and protecting the citizens 
of the country and fighting the enemy centered its attention on expulsion of 
citizens and destroying their homes. The soldiers were told that if the army did 
not succeed in the mission of expulsion, the result would be tantamount to the 
destruction of the “Third Temple”15.  
 
The “cost of the evacuation” is depicted as traumatic for the history of the Jewish 
people, and the “trauma of the evacuation” is conceived as a potential dissolution of the 
foundations of the settler colonial citizenship. Fundamentally, one of the effects of the 
moral economy of the evacuation is precisely that of extending to the whole political and 
moral community a specific suffering associated with the potential end of the settler 
colonial project.  
 
                                                        




Once we have understood the relevance of such debates and tensions for our broader 
reflection on the politics of trauma we have to continue exploring the political field of 
force we defined as the costs of the evacuation and its inherent moral economy in relation to 
other dynamics that went on after the Gaza pullout. The debate and the practices related 
to the “administration of the evacuation” progressively included other new actors, 
further expanding the field of force of the costs of the evacuation far beyond the reductionist 
polarization of state vs settlers.  
Immediately after the evacuation, various Zionist Israeli NGOs and non-governmental 
actors progressively entered the debate and continued to attack SELA –the 
Disengagement Administration– and the government on different fronts, rearticulating 
their traumatic register and readapting it to the post-evacuation setting. Some newspaper 
articles based on information gathered through these non-governmental organizations 
reported on the “governmental mismanagement” of the evacuation as follows:  
 
Mere days before the date of evacuation, however, SELA authorities realized 
that the 1,000 hotel rooms they had reserved [in Israel, for the evacuees] were 
insufficient for the 1,700 families that were to be moved out: 2,500 were 
necessary. […] There were no government-provided social workers on the scene 
at the various hotels to assist with the trauma of relocation and to give practical 
logistical advice16.  
 
Warning of the risk of a “humanitarian disaster” –a notion used by some settler 
spokespersons already during the evacuation– some civil society organizations, 
individuals, and NGOs such as the Legal Forum for the Land of Israel and Lem’an Achai 
(“For my brothers”, an NGO working in the field of mental care) mobilized and 
provided various forms of assistance to the evacuees. These organizations –in spite of 
their harsh critiques against the governmental Disengagement Administration– 
coordinated with it in order to facilitate accommodation of the evacuees in hotels, school 
dormitories, caravans and tents.  
Lem’an Achai delivered immediate psychological assistance and counseling to the 
evacuees, while launching an emergency campaign in their support. Immediately after the 
evacuation, the Chairperson of the NGO launched the initiative with a critical open letter 
to the Israeli civil society:  
                                                        




9,000 Israeli citizens have become displaced persons overnight. […] Many are 
still wearing the clothes they were evicted in. […] Friends, it is our privilege to 
help them come to terms with their trauma and begin to rebuild their lives. […] 
The Government Disengagement Authority (SELA) and the Statutory Welfare 
Services, who are technically responsible for the care of the evacuees, have 
already proven themselves to be incapable or uninterested in providing effective 
care. […] Lema'an Achai will now use our expertise to separately provide mental 
health and crisis services to the evacuees of Gush Katif.17 
 
 
Concurrently with these advocacy initiatives, the Legal Forum for the Land of Israel and 
other legal organizations continued to denounce “governmental negligence” through 
legal actions and constant monitoring. The main accusation of negligence revolved 
around a general governmental lack of compassion for the evacuees: “Official sensitivity 
to the humanitarian needs of the displaced residents is non-existent”18. The initiatives in 
support of the evacuees translated into a regular media coverage focusing on “how 
badly” the situation of the evacuees had been managed by the state authorities. Many 
media reported on the “issue of the evacuees” through the double register of trauma and 
lack of compensation for the evacuees housed in caravans and other temporary forms of 
accommodation. The pressure of these initiatives against “governmental humanitarian 
and operational negligence” resulted in the creation –in February 2009 by the newly-
established Netanyahu government– of an ad hoc State Commission of Inquiry charged 
with evaluating the Authorities’ treatment of the evacuees of Gush Katif [the name of the 
settlements’ block in Gaza] and Samaria [the West Bank].  
The commission led by the deputy president emeritus of the Supreme Court –the highest 
judicial body in Israel– and by two other members, released its final report in June 2010. 
The report, which expressed a harsh condemnation of treatment of the evacuees by the 
state institutions allows us to further grasp the settler colonial nature of the state and, 
more fundamentally, another key level of the moral economy of the evacuations. The 
report condemned the way the state handled the evacuation, highlighting a series of 
“governance problems”, such as the lack of pre-evacuation communication between 
settlers and state; mismanagement of the community relocations; and – entering the 
debate on the “good” and “bad forms of government”– the Commission diplomatically 
criticized Ariel Sharon’s choice of SELA as the administrative body for the evacuations:  
                                                        
17 Lem’an Achai, Emergency Campaign for Gush Katif, public appeal published on Israel Resource News 
Agency, Aug. 22 2005 http://www.israelbehindthenews.com/bin/content.cgi?ID=2304&q=1 
 




The commission believes that the decision to establish SELA administration as 
one entity that centralizes the handling of all matters connected with the 
evacuees –was the right one. […] However, because of the SELA 
administration’s lack of experience in settlement related matters, the task of 
resettling the evacuees should have been implemented by the Settlement Division [of the World 
Zionist Organization]. (STATE COMMISSION FINAL REPORT 2011) 
 
Administration of the evacuation is inscribed by the commission of inquiry within the 
competence framework of the highest existing Zionist body –the World Zionist 
Organization–, identified as the most competent institution for dealing with Zionist 
matters related to settling and unsettling the “land of Israel” –and their morality. 
In parallel and together with the identification of the best possible bodies to handle any 
future evacuations, the report discussed the issue of the costs of the disengagement and 
praised the efforts of non-governmental organizations like the Legal Forum for the Land 
of Israel (or Lem’an Achai) in alleviating the suffering of the evacuees. The monetary and 
moral costs are taken to be interdependent:  
 
The commission also criticized the prolonged stay in transitory residences of 
hotels […] which caused the evacuees great suffering and also cost the state 
treasury a great deal of money. The commission praised social organizations and 
volunteers that mobilized to help the evacuees during this difficult time and ease 
their suffering. (STATE COMMISSION FINAL REPORT  2011)  
 
The commission report continued by recommending that the state, in the case of future 
evacuations, create a team of experts and “professionals, at least some of whom have a 
connection to socio-psychological treatment in crisis and disaster situations 
[and] combine the rehabilitation [of the evacuees, called “rehabilitees”] with a general 
national objective, such as strengthening settlement in [and transferring the evacuees] 
areas of national priority”. The “areas of national priority” include –according to the list 
released by the Netanyahu government in 2009– those areas of Israel with a major 
demographic presence of Palestinians and the main colonies’ blocks in the West Bank. 
Thus, one of the suggestions of the state commission, expressed in the form of a policy 
recommendation, is to compensate the “injury” of the evacuations by increasing and 
strengthening colonization of other priority territories for the nation –colonization as 
rehabilitation: re-engagement after disengagement, somehow similarly to what happened 
after the disengagement from Sinai.   
These policy recommendations are not surprising if we consider them in light of the 
broader semantic and moral framework in which the commission of enquiry inscribed its 
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final report. In fact the members of the commission resorted to a vocabulary of 
metaphors related to the semantic and discursive field of suffering. Talking about the 
“identity crisis” of the settlers –described in the report as “pioneers exiled from their 
homes” uprooted from a “blossoming region” (the occupied Gaza Strip)– the juridical 
experts overlapped their technical and normative recommendations with an affective 
register: “Contrary to their beliefs and their life plans, with a seething heart and 
melancholy soul, choked with tears of grief, humiliation and pain, the settlers evacuated 
bustling settlements”. The panel of judges portrayed the settlers as victims of a 
cumulative trauma:  
 
They contended with an unstable security situation and for years they bore the 
brunt of the shelling, attacks by terrorists, attacks on the roads and all kinds of 
calamities. The price was high […] but their spirit never flagged. The scars of 
their bodies strengthened their commitment [to colonization]. […] Gush Katif 
was a unique region. […] The settlers took upon themselves national missions 
[such as] making the region bloom [and] absorbing large numbers of immigrants 
[new settlers]. The evacuation hurt all of these. […] People who perceived 
themselves as implementing Zionism ostensibly became a burden and a 
millstone. […] The sense of betrayal experienced by the evacuated settlers was 
shared by more than a few among the general population of Israel. […] It was a 
shining page of civics in the annals of the state, when […] the settlers behaved 
with responsibility and restraint, with the aim of avoiding a civil war. The heroes 
of the settlements became the heroes of the evacuation. (STATE 
COMMISSION FINAL REPORT 2011) 
 
The commission concludes its report saying that it does not intend to take a position on 
the question of the justice of the disengagement. But a state body composed of members 
of the Supreme Court, celebrating its settlers as pioneers who “made the desert bloom” –
the foundational myth of Zionism– and accusing of disrespect for human rights the 
settler colonial state that had carried out the evacuation, can hardly be considered a 
situation in which the justice of the disengagement is not at stake. On the contrary, the 
report is an illuminating document, a state word sanctioning –through the language of 
“good” and “bad government” of the disengagement– the intrinsic moral justness of 
Zionism and the settler colonial enterprise. By judging the history of Zionism as an 
illuminating history of settlement, the commission inscribed the evacuation as a historical 




Neither the evacuation from Sinai, nor that from Gaza resulted in the construction of a 
“decolonized relationship” (Veracini 2010: 106) between Israelis and Palestinians. On the 
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contrary, both disengagements can be understood as moments in which what is 
performed by an array of state and non-state actors –from the political analyst to the 
journalist; from the settler to the scholar; from the prime minister to the parliamentary 
speaker; from the soldier to the mental health practitioner; from the NGO operator to 
the Supreme Court judge– is the reaffirmation of the moral justness of the inherent 
relationship of dispossession on which the settler colonial order is constituted. In the 
moral economy of settler colonialism trauma is mobilized as a discursive apparatus 
whose political effect is the disavowal of Israel’s colonial history of settler dispossession 
started in 1948 with the creation of the state and the re-enactment of the settler colonial 
project as one of moral justice.   
What I have attempted to demonstrate is that one of the constitutive elements in the 
moral economy of Israel’s settler colonialism is the production of a “moral inversion” –
the social construction of settler moral tropes representing the dispossessor as 
traumatized victim and the evacuation as a settler national trauma– whose ultimate effect 
is a delimitation of the boundaries of the settler political community, and an effort to 
avoid a rethinking of the settler colonial relationship and prevent an opening up to the 
decolonization of Palestine. Fundamentally, the evacuations are moments in which settler 
colonial dispossession and violence are re-enacted. In fact, the state-led 1982 movement 
of evacuated Jewish settlers from Sinai to Gaza and the West Bank showed that the 
settler displacement of the Sinai trauma coincided with the new displacement of the 
native. More than twenty years later, the 2005 evacuation from the Gaza Strip resulted in 
the increase of colonial control and humanitarian siege on the inhabitants of the Gaza 
Strip, with the last Israeli military operation –“Pillar of Defense” (November 2012)– 
legitimized by the Israeli Army also in terms of “trauma prevention” among the Israeli 
population, hence applying the argument of trauma prevention as an alleged 
legitimization of the sovereign right to kill the colonized. 19 
There is no doubt that an interrogation of dispossession has to analyze the various ways 
dispossession is systematically put in place on a daily basis, with its different degrees of 
violence and institutionalization of the regime of inequality that provides the scaffolding 
of settler colonialism. But when this interrogation is carried out in a context of moral 
tension between “victorious victims” and “dominated victims” (Darwish 1997: 29), the 
study of the moments of rupture and inversion of this relationship of dispossession can 
                                                        




decisively aid our understanding of both the moments of intense violence which receive 
a wide media coverage (often without the due historicization of the events) and the very 
nature of the settler colonial relationship itself in Israel/Palestine.  
The inversions I have analyzed embody the will to reproduce –by performing and 
adopting the peculiar moral economy of settler colonialism I have described– the moral 
legitimacy of an array of operations of power whose ultimate objective is settling and 
dispossessing. The multiple protagonists of the evacuations I have focused on are 
certainly very far from the most widespread images of “the settlers” (religious, 
fundamentalist, violent, illiberal, living in the occupied West Bank or Golan Heights), but 
the heuristic value of the operations I have analyzed consists precisely in the fact that 
they tell us about a moral economy shared by a conspicuous number of different Israeli 
social and political actors: one that impedes, within the settler colonial body politic, the 
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